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"PUBLIC BUILDING" AND "PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT"
AS DEFINED UNDER WISCONSIN
SAFE PLACE STATUTE
The Wisconsin Safe Place Statute' has been the subject of much
litigation. The liability of an owner and/or employer depends upon
the situs of the injury. No recovery can be had unless the injury oc-
curred as a result of a structural defect in a "public building ' 2 or as a
result of an unsafe "place of employment. ' 3 A discussion of the fac-
tors employed by the Wisconsin Court in defining these terms will be
undertaken here. The majority of cases construing these provisions
deal with educational, charitable and municipal activities. The re-
maining ones are obviously commercial and easily handled.
Prior to 1957, Section 101.01(12) of the Wisconsin Statutes read:
"The term 'public building' as used in sections 101.01 to
101.29 shall mean and include any structure used in whole or in
part as a place of resort, assemblage, lodging, trade, traffic,
occupancy, or use by the public, or by three or more tenants."
Beginning with Bent v. Jonet,4 a highly elastic construction was
placed on the term "building," so as to make it the practical equivalent
of "anything constructed" for use within one of the purposes specified.
1 West's Wis. Stats. Ann. §101.06 (1957), recites: "Every employer shall furnish
employment which shall be safe for the employes therein and shall furnish a
place of employment which shall be safe for employes therein and for fre-
quenters thereof and shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, and
shall adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render such
employment and places of employment safe, and shall do every other thing
reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety, and welfare of such
employees and frequenters. Every employer and every owner of a place of
employment or a public building now or hereafter consrtucted shall so con-
struct, repair or maintain such place of employment or public building as to
render the same safe."
2 West's Wis. Stats. Ann. §101.01 (12) (1957: "The term 'public building' as
used in ss. 101.01 to 101.29 means and includes any structure, including exterior
parts of such building, such as a porch, exterior platform or steps providing
means of ingress or egress, used in whole or in part as a place of resort, as-
semblage, lodging, trade, traffic, occupancy, or use by the public or by 3 or
more tenants."
3 Wis. Stat. 101.01 (1) (1955), states: "The phrase 'place of employment' means
and includes every place, whether indoors or out or underground and the
premises appurtenant thereto where either temporarily or permanently any in-
dustry, trade or business is carried on, or where any process or operation,
directly or indirectly related to any industry, trade, or business, is carried on,
and where any person is, directly or indirectly, employed by another for direct
or indirect gain or profit, but shall not include any place where persons are
employed in (a) private domestic service which does not involve the use of
mechanical power or (b) farming. The term 'farming' includes those activi-
ties specified in s. 102.04(4), and also includes the transportation of farm
products, supplies or equipment directly to the farm by the operator of said
farm or his employes for use thereon, if such activities are directly or in-
directly for the purpose of producing commodities for market, or as an
accessory to such production."
4213 Wis. 635, 252 N.W. 290 (1934), 126 A.L.R. 1245 ( ).
[Vol. 42
COMMENTS
The court stated in the Bent decision that the statute had no require-
ment that the structure resembie an inclosure with walls and roof.
Simultaneously, and beginning with Cegelski v. Green Bay,5 a mere
landscaping was held not to constitute a "building" or "structure" re-
gardless of intended use.
Furthermore, until the change in the statute,6 platforms, concourses,
steps, and approaches, though appurtenant to buildings, were also out-
side the statute.
Following the broad construction of the Bent case, wherein tem-
porary bleachers were held to constitute a "public building," the court
decided a pier 7 and a pool5 were likewise "public buildings."
In Feirn v. Shorewood Hills,9 the minor plaintiff alleged that her
injuries were occasioned by a fall upon the platform of a public pier.
The pier consisted of a boardwalk and platform which extended out
into the lake. Located on the platform was a wooden bench, a diving
board, and an observation tower. The complaint further alleged that
the pier was used in whole or in part as a place of resort and assemblage
for occupancy and use by the public. In affirming the lower court,
which overruled the defendant City's demurrer, the supreme court
held that in view of the allegations as to the nature and manner of the
construction and the defendant's intended and actual use of the plat-
form and pier, it was a structure and "public building" under the
safe place statute.
Some five years after the Feirn decision, the court in Flesch v. Lan-.
caster,"° held that a swimming pool was a "public building." The plain-
tiff, surviving her son who drowned in a municipal pool, alleged as
one of her causes of action that the pool was a "public building" and
structure used in whole or in part as a place of resort and assemblage
for occupancy and use by the 'public. These allegations were again
held sufficient against demurrer.
While the court applied the broad construction of the Bent case in
the Feirn and Flescl.-decisions, it refused to extend the doctrine in
two cases:" where landscaping was alleged to constitute a structure. In
Cegelski v. Green Bay, plaintiff was injured when the toboggan on
which he was riding collided with a snowdrift at the bottom of a
toboggan hill. The supreme court held that the slide was not a "build-
ing" nor a structure because it followed the natural slope of the hill.
The municipality merely kept the surface of the ground smoothed and
5 231 Wis. 89, 285 N.W. 343 (1939).6 Compare Wis. Stat. §101.01(12) quoted in text w;'h note 2 supra.
7Feirn v. Shorewood Hills, 253 Wis. 418, 34 N.W. 2d 107 (1948).
s Flesch v. Lancaster, 264 Wis. 234, 58 N.W. 2d 710 (1953).
9 See note 7 supra.
'1 See note 8 supra.
i Cegelski v. Green Bay, *supra note 5. Hoepner v. City of Eau Claire, 264 Wis.
608, 60 N.W. 2d 392 (1953).
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covered with ice and snow. Although a guide railing was used, plain-
tiff did not allege that it was unsafe or a cause of his injury.
In another ground surface case, the plaintiff was injured while
playing softball on a municipal baseball field. The plaintiff in Hoepner
v. City of Eau Claire,"2 broke his leg when his shoe cleat caught on a
piece of buried wire. He maintained that the additional earth used in
the construction of the field constituted the field a "structure." The
court embarked on an historical treatment of the statute and decided
that the word "structure" was used by the legislature to define the
words "public building." The court decided that the bleachers, pier
and pool in the Bent, Feirn andFlesch cases had some similarity to a
building while the baseball field did not so qualify.
In all of the above cases, the places in question were apparently
intended and used as places of resort and assemblage for occupancy
and use by the public, the distinguishing factor being that not all of
them involved a structure independent of the natural terrain. On the
basis of these cases, one would assume that an allegation that a struc-
ture is a "public building" would withstand demurrer, as long as the
structure in question is more than a mere surfacing of the natural
terrain, and is used in whole or in part as a place of resort and as-
semblage for occupancy and use by the public.
An analysis of the latest decision 1 3 in this area apparently substanti-
ates this assumption to some degree. Although this conclusion is not
apparent from a reading of the opinion itself, an examination of the
briefs submitted provides further facts which establish partial con-
formity of this case with the previous decisions. The minor plaintiffs,
in Ball v. City of Madison,14 were injured when their toboggan left
a municipally constructed slide at a curve and collided with an adjacent
tree. The slide consisted of an elevated wooden platform to which was
attached a wooden ramp leading to the ground. An iced track continued
from the edge of the ramp to the end of the slide. Ice was placed on
the wooden ramp and on the ground adjacent thereto to form one con-
tinuous course. The plaintiffs maintained that the platform, ramp and
iced track constituted one integral unit and resembled the pier in the
Feirn case. The defendant city, however, contended that the slide (iced
track) was divisible; and, inasmuch as the curve was in the iced track
portion, the case was ruled by Cegelski v. Green Bay. The injuries were
not sustained on the wooden platform or wooden ramp. The supreme
court, in sustaining the defendant City's demurrer, held that the case
was largely ruled by the Cegelski decision. At the point of injury,
there was no structure, but merely an arrangement of ice which was
12 See note 11 supra.




placed upon and followed the natural slope of the hill. Although the
defense maintained that the allegation that the" slide was one integrated
unit was a conclusion, and therefore not admitted on demurrer, the
court proceeded expressly to disqualify the wooden platform as a
"public building." The opinion accomplished this on two apparently
distinct grounds. Following the rule of the Hoepner case, the court
held that the platform did not resemble a building as that term is com-
monly understood. The court further held that it was not a place of
resort and assemblage as alleged by the plaintiffs. The public usages
outlined in the statute are not confined to resort and assemblage; and
it is unfortunate that the court did not determine whether the platform
was intended and used in whole or in part as a place of "traffic" by
the public. Had the court definitely stated that any one of the public
uses required by the statute was present, it would be clear that the case
turned entirely upon failure of the platform to meet the building simi-
larity test. On the other hand, had the court recited that the use of
the platform could never qualify under any of the statutory purposes,
the discussion of building similarity would seem relatively unimportant
to the decision.
Because the court has failed to make these distinctions, it would
appear that the Ball decision has not altered the structural requirement
in the "public building" definition. Also, even if these distinctions had
been drawn, it is questionable whether the court would have given less
controlling weight to the Cegelski rule. Although not stated unequivo-
cally in the opinion, it would appear reasonable to assume that the court
determined that the Cegelski rule should be applied to the iced track,
regardless of whether it be considered separately or as a part of the
entire slide structure.
The minority adopts and the majority does not expressly reject the
argument that in defining the term "public building," an adjacent area
can become integrated with a structure and thereby qualify as a build-
ing. Where does one draw the line in the integrated structure theory?
Do you integrate a baseball field with the bleachers which surround it?
Do you integrate an administrative building in a park with all the
park facilities? Do you integrate a bathhouse with a beach? If the
concept of "integrated structure" be rejected, then the quarrel whether
the platform qualified as a public building is beside the point. Rather
than disqualify the wooden platform and ramp as a "public building,"
the majority should have firmly recited that the actual situs of the
injury must qualify in itself.'
Although recovery also can be had under the safe place statute
when the injury occurs at a "place of employment,"' 6 the complaint in
15 Scanlon v. St. Francis Seminary, 264 Wis. 603, 60 N.W. 2d 381 (1953).
16 See note 3 supra.
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the Ball case failed to allege that the slide or any part of it constituted
such a place. An examination of the previous decisions discloses the
reason for the absence of such allegation.
In Hoepner v. City of Eau Claire, the court determined that the
baseball diamond was not a "place of employment," even though city
employees connected with its operation were paid. The decision re-
cited that the city was not engaged in any industry, trade or business
and that the employees were not employed for direct or indirect gain
or profit. Although the gain or profit mentioned in the statutory defi-
nition would appear to concern gain or profit to the employee, this
case indicates that such profit must be attributed to the employer. The
statutory construction announced in the Hoepner case was earlier ap-
plied in Cegelski v. Green Bay and Waldman v. Young Men's Christian
Assoc.17 In the Cegelski case, municipal employees were engaged in
the preparation and maintenance of the toboggan slide. The court held
that at the point of injury the City was not carrying on a trade, oc-
cupation or process of manufacture; and that it was not operating the
toboggan slide for profit. The Waldman case, although dealing with
an eleemosynary institution, applied the same doctrine. Here the minor
plaintiff was injured when struck by an improvised diving board. The
defendant's employee was conducting a swimming class at the time of
the injury. The court held that the situs of injury was not a "place of
employment," as the portion of the premises in which the accident oc-
curred was not one in which an industry, trade or business was being
carried on, nor was any person employed there for direct or indirect
gain or profit. It is to be noted that the court here held the charging
of nominal registration fees to be immaterial.
There have also been attempts to qualify other locations of muni-
cipal activities as "places of employment." The plaintiff in Kirchoff v.
City of JanesvilleB wanted to qualify a woodworking classroom as
such a place. The defendant operated and maintained the Janesville
Vocation School. The plaintiff was injured while attending a course
of instruction. He alleged that a defective machine constituted the
woodworking classroom an unsafe "place of employment." The court
held that a place of instruction, operated by a municipality, is not a
"place of employment under the safe place statute as the legislature
never intended the statute to have such effect." Even though the ma-
terial produced by the woodworking class was salable, the court stated
that the defendant city was not engaged in any industry, trade or busi-
ness, as the salable articles were merely the result of giving vocational
instruction. The presence of paid municipal instructors was held in-
sufficient to constitute the classroom a "place of employment."
17227 Wis. 43, 277 N.W. 632 (1938).
18 255 Wis. 202, 38 N.W. 2d 698 (1949).
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The plaintiff in Padley v. Village of Lodi,29 on the other hand,
maintained that a street was a "place of employment." She was injured
when her foot caught on a protruding water main shut-off box in a
paved street. No one was working on the street at the time of injury.
Plaintiff apparently felt that maintenance of the water box was a
continuing proprietary function of the city and as such constituted the
area a "place of employment."
The court, in denying recovery, stated that:
"A place of employment originally meant and still does mean
a place where active work, either temporary or permanent, is
being conducted in connection with a business for profit; where
some process or opeiation related to such industry, trade or
business is carried on; and where any person is directly or in-
directly employed by another."
Had municipal employees been engaged in active work at the site of
the injury, plaintiff would have had the additional burden of establish-
ing that the city was engaged in a proprietary rather than a govern-
mental function. Under the circumstances actually present, the prob-
lem was moot.
The above cases illustrate that the presence of paid employees at a
location does not by itself constitute the situs a "place of employment."
In addition, to qualify as such place, the employer nfust be engaged in
an industry, trade, or business for profit. 20 Inasmuch as the court has
been reluctant to consider municipal recreational facilities commercial
operations,2 and inasmuch as the majority of other municipal functions
apparently are governmental, it would appear that a municipality has
a very limited liability as "employer" under the "place of employment"
provisions of the statute. One would almost be prompted to conclude
that a city's liability as such "employer" is as severely limited as is its
common law negligence liability. The two are comparable at least to
the extent that the proprietary character of the activity must be es-
tablished in both instances to overcome the immunity.
Under the safe place statute, an "owner" 22 of a "place of employ-
19 233 Wis. 661, 290 N.W. 136 (1940).
20 Also see, Cross v. Levenberger, 267 Wis. 232, 65 N. r. 2d 35 (1954).
21 The court has generally held that the conduct of such activities as parks, play-
grounds, bathing beaches, and swimming pools are governmental functions
rather than commercial enterprises. Nemet v. Kenosha, 169 Wis. 379, 177 N.W.
711 (1919) ; Gensch v. Milwaukee, 179 Wis. 95, 190 N.W. 843 (1922) ; Cegelski
v. Green Bay, 231 Wis. 89, 285 N.W. 343 (1939).
22 Wis. Stat. §101.01 (13) (1955) : "The term 'owner' shall mean and include every
person, firm, corporation, state, county, town, city, village, school district, sewer
district, drainage district and other public or quasi-public corporations as well
as any manager, representative, officer, or other person having ownership, con-
trol or custody of any place of employment or public building, or of the con-
struction, repair or maintenance of any place of employment or public build-
ing, or who prepares plans for the construction of any place of employment or
public building. Said sections 101.01 to 101.29, inclusive, shall apply, so far as
consistent, to all architects and builders."
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ment" can also incur liability. The "owner's" liability, however, is ap-
parently less extensive than the "employer's."
In the recent case of Potter v. City of Kenosha,2" the city was not
liable as "owner" because the court determined that the city retained no
control and custody over the area when it awarded a sewer contract
to an independent contractor. The City of Kenosha, however, did
retain the right to inspect or change the plan with reference to the con-
struction. Such retention was held insufficient to constitute the city
the "owner" for statutory purposes. The independent contractor here
was considered both "owner" and "employer."
When an "owner," however, employs several distinct contractors,
as in the construction of a building, he will be deemed to have such
custody and control as the statute requires.2 4 The Potter case indicated
that the city could be liable as "owner" had it engaged several con-
tractors for the various phases of the work. It is to be noted, however,
that liability in such instance would attach only if the city had actual
or constructive notice of the defect which caused the injury.25
The practical advantages of pleading a personal injury case under
the safe place statute are, generally, two: first, the plaintiff's burden
of proof is considerably reduced because of non-necessity of proving
negligence; and, second, municipal and eleemosynary immunity from
suit does not extend, per se, to such actions. 2 6
Much of the force of the latter advantage disappears, however,
when the limited definitions of the terms "public building" and "place
of employment" are taken into account. The foregoing analysis has
sought to indicate these limitations of definition.
ROBERT CHOINSKI
23268 Wis. 361, 68 N.W. 2d 4 (1955). Also see Burmeister v. Damrow, 273 Wis.
568, 79 N.W. 2d 87 (1956).24 Waskow v. Robert L. Reisinger & Co., 180 Wis. 537, 193 N.W. 357 (1923);
Umnus v. Wisconsin Public Service Corp., 260 Wis. 433, 51 N.W. 2d 42 (1952).
25 Kaczmarski v. F. Rosenberg Elevator Co., 216 Wis. 553, 257 N.W. 598 (1934)
Williams v. International Oil Co., 267 Wis. 227, 64 N.W. 2d 817 (1954).
26 Wright v. St. Mary's Hospital of Franciscan Sisters, 265 Wis. 502, 61 N.W. 2d
900 (1953) ; Grabinski v. St. Francis Hospital, 266 Wis. 339, 63 N.W. 2d 693
(1954).
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